Post amended to reflect corrections from Justin Silverman. He did not receive an email from me in February 2025, and I’m unable to find the email I thought I sent when I wrote this article on 11 February 2025. (My best guess is that I drafted it and didn’t press send.) I have apologized to Dr. Silverman for not checking with him again in 2025 or in 2026 prior to re-posting and have amended the article to reflect the fact that we corresponded in 2022 and 2023, with him responding promptly both times. See additional note at the end of the article.
There are significant discrepancies between the flu surveillance data reported in a June 2020 study by Justin Silverman, Nathaniel Hupert, and Alex Washburne, and data I obtained in 2022 for the same variables. Both datasets were sourced from the New York City Department of Health & Mental Hygiene (NYC DOH).
Sources
In their study, Using influenza surveillance networks to estimate state-specific prevalence of SARS-CoV-2 in the United States (Silverman et al., 2020), the authors used data on emergency department visits for influenza-like illness (ILI) and admissions for ILI to estimate excess ILI in New York City.1
After obtaining the same data over the same time-frame from NYC DOH in 2022 I reached out to Drs. Silverman and Washburne for the underlying data used in their analysis in 2022 and again in 2023. Each time, they responded promptly and directed me to Dr. Silverman’s GitHub repository. [Clarification in bold]
Data
Figures 1 and 2 compare the data used by Silverman et al. in 2020 with the data I received. While the differences in ILI admission data are minimal, there are significant discrepancies in the timing and magnitude of the ILI emergency department visit datasets. Notably, these discrepancies are not confined to the 2020 period but also extend to the middle of the 2017-2018 flu season. As a result, the differences in ILI ED visits lead to varying admit rates and a significantly different admit “peaks” in January, February, and March 2020, shown in Figure 3.
Figure 1: NYC ILI ED Visits, 24 Dec 2017 – 1 April 2020: Silverman et al (2020) versus Hockett (2023)
Figure 2: NYC ILI Admissions from ED, 24 Dec 2017 – 1 April 2020: Silverman et al (2020) versus Hockett (2023)
Figure 3: NYC ILI Admits Rates from ED to hospital (ILI Admissions/ILI ED Visits), 24 Dec 2017 – 1 April 2020: Silverman et al (2020) versus Hockett (2023)
I prefer to discuss and attempt to resolve the conflict with Dr. Silverman, rather than further describe or speculate about the possible reasons for the conflict. If the ILI ED visit data we each received employs different operational definitions, the discrepancies may be resolvable or the result of error on my part. If they are not, we may be able to compel an explanation from the city health department.
I contacted Dr. Silverman and Dr. Washburne this weekend [February 2025] but have not yet received a response and document the discrepancy here as a matter of public interest and as a part of my dedicated inquiry regarding what happened in New York City in spring 2020.
Other examples of discrepant data related to the New York City mass casualty event
This is not the first or only instance of discrepant data related to the New York mass casualty event. Other examples include emergency department visits at Elmhurst Hospital, bed occupancy at Elmhurst Hospital, the timing and magnitude of deaths in New York City public hospitals,2 and number of New York City COVID deaths occurring at home as reported by state and federal sources.3
Data discrepancies are not the only issue surrounding the event in which officials claim an additional 27,000 deaths more than normal occurred. Eleven “sets” of serious problems challenge the government narrative about what transpired and why:
The massive spike in fatalities in New York City over a very short period appears to be, in part, the result of data engineering and closely mirrors a similar, staged event in Bergamo, Italy.
UPDATE 6 February 2026: I’ve emailed Silverman and Washburne again in a good-faith attempt to enlist their help in resolving the discrepancy with NYC DOHMH. If we approach the agency together, we have a better chance of compelling an explanation than if I approach the agency alone.
SECOND UPDATE, 6 February 2026: Dr. Silverman responded promptly and said he did not receive an email from me in early 2025, as I reported having sent. It’s possible I drafted the email and did not press “send,” as I now can’t find record of it. I will attempt to get an explanation from NYC DOHMH about the differences in what they supplied. My interest is in knowing which dataset reflects the agency’s claims about reality – i.e., the number of visits for ILI daily.
Original version of this article in which I said I had emailed Drs. Silverman and Washburne and not received a response:
- See Fig. S3. Surveillance data from New York City emergency departments. ↩︎
- UPDATE: These are the focus of complaints submitted to two federal entities on 3 February 2026: https://woodhouse76.com/2026/02/03/complaint-against-new-york-city-health-hospitals-filed-with-prac-and-hhs-oig-submission-date-3-february-2026/ ↩︎
- Hockett, J. (2023, April 23). “The ‘Covid death’ reckoning.” Wood House 76. ↩︎
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