Dr Jonathan Engler, Jessica Hockett PhD, & Prof Martin Neil

Republication of “This Covid Narrative Collapses under the slightest scrutiny” (The Conservative Woman, 30 June 2025). We did not receive a response or acknowledgement from Mr. Ridley or from Prof Anton van der Merwe of the University of Oxford.


On 1 June 2025 The Daily Telegraph published the following article by Matt Ridley:

(An archived version accessible to non-subscribers can be found here.)

This preface introduced an academic paper written by Lord Ridley and Professor Anton van der Merwe of the University of Oxford.

Before addressing some of the paper’s language and claims, it’s worth noting the irony of one of the UK’s most influential news organizations—whose Global Health coverage is partially funded by the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation—declaring: “Here’s the Covid Paper They Don’t Want You to Read.” If “they” truly didn’t want it read, would it be featured in a mass-media outlet with millions of readers? (Not likely.)

The paper itself advances the following narrative:

  • A novel virus emerged suddenly in Wuhan “sometime in the last four months of 2019”, causing the first human case of a new disease eventually called COVID-19, and an “outbreak” of illness and death that wasn’t “caught” and contained in time.
  • This was the result of a “lab leak” which “Big Science” has been ignoring or downplaying.
  • Said virus circumnavigated the globe from a point source and was directly responsible for tens of millions of deaths and widespread suffering throughout the world.

These assumptions buckle under scrutiny and render the notion that “the COVID-19 pandemic began as a result of a research accident” both misleading and unsubstantiated. Indeed, readily available evidence shows a pandemic only “began” when a political declaration was made – not with an empirically-observable or remarkable biological phenomenon that required a response of any kind.

Up until the point of the pandemic declaration there was never a solid epidemiological or medical basis for alleging the existence of a pathogenic threat to the world; only after the response was declared did mortality rise.

The SARS-CoV-2 story “began” in late December 2019, with Chinese health alerts evocative of a Medical Mystery Theatre prologue: There’s a cluster of pneumonia cases of unknown etiology in Wuhan…

This was followed by a speedy succession of events in a four-week span that included:

  • claims of unique symptoms,
  • ostensible discovery of a ‘new’ causal agent,
  • development of a reliable test to ‘detect’ the agent,
  • alleged ‘confirmation’ of the agent transmitting from human-to-human,
  • speculation about possible sources of the agent (e.g., a market, a lab, a cave),
  • the WHO declaring a Public Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC)

However, through our own investigations and the analyses of others, we have found substantial direct evidence culled from hundreds of research papers, official reports and from analyses of official statistics from multiple countries suggesting that:

  • the significance of the purportedly unique fingerprint—commonly assumed to imply the agent to be both synthetic and more dangerous than competing natural viruses—is contradicted by published research, and by known hard limits to what is currently possible in biology;
  • a causal relationship between the agent and a new or dangerous type of pneumonia or disease was never demonstrated;
  • the novelty, integrity, and stability of the agent remains unproven;
  • the newly-invented tests—used to diagnose current or prior infection by the agent—were not specific to that agent, but instead cross-reacted with other viruses, including those causing the common cold and influenza-like-illnesses;
  • studies and reports fail to substantiate transmission claims, and
  • time-series mortality data and ‘on-the-ground’ evidence, culled from official statistics, are at odds with what would be expected in the event of a novel, dangerous, spreading disease consistent with a ‘pandemic’.

Based on his own writings, and by his own admission in the Telegraph article, Ridley has always viewed the origins question by entertaining and exploring only two options: the agent either leaked from a lab or by way of a discrete zoonotic event in a wet market. We regard this framing as unscientific, as it has the effect of limiting other possibilities, stymying genuine inquiry, and bypassing what we have come to understand is the far more important question:

Is the sudden emergence of a novel SARS-like virus causative of a new disease, spreading from human to human, as initially claimed by the WHO and CCP, the most likely explanation for the events which have come to be known as “the COVID pandemic”?

A significant problem with Ridley and van der Merwe’s argument is that (as they concede) they present only circumstantial evidence for a “lab leak”. They completely fail to examine any research which might (and indeed does) contradict their hypothesis nor do they assess whether the observable consequences of their hypothesis are consistent with the idea of a pandemic, which they assume as axiomatic.

Likewise, they deliberately frame the hypotheses as a choice between two mutually exclusive alternatives: lab-leak or wet-market. This framing explicitly excludes two rather obvious alternative explanations: one being that there never was a new virus, and another that this virus was already endemic globally, perhaps for decades, but was simply novel to detection. If anything, their myopic focus on a single hypothesis reflects nothing more than an ex-cathedra belief that such a leak could and did trigger a local epidemic and, subsequently, a global pandemic.

Emails showing disagreement and faction-forming between scientists, lack of cooperation from China, individuals acting to protect themselves and their interests, hubristic grant proposals, cave-scouring activities, fibs about research funding, grandiose theoretical models, reported activities in laboratories, safety protocol breaches, a few lab workers getting sick after working with chemicals, secrecy surrounding database deletions—none of these things is scientific evidence of a transmissible pathogen departing a lab via a worker or any other means. Feynman said science is the distrust of experts, yet Ridley/van der Merwe simply accept the collective word of these “experts” at face value and fail to subject it to even modest scrutiny.

The authors seem aware that their evidence is limited and non-conclusive, conceding that their “facts amount to a strong though circumstantial case for suspecting that a laboratory leak started the pandemic”. In other words, facts amassed over five years haven’t produced a hypothesis developed beyond conjecture—only a response to a single question framed as a false dilemma.

The Ridley/van der Merwe hypothesis also places an undue emphasis on the attributes of “the sequence” which came to be named SARS-CoV-2. If the core claims—that a novel pathogen suddenly spread, triggered waves of illness, and caused deaths that would not (absent doing anything “in response”) have otherwise occurred—don’t hold up, then the speedy (and specious) output of a suite of relatively new and imperfectly understood sequencing technologies is surely the wrong starting point.

Science favours the most parsimonious hypothesis that successfully survives serious attempts to falsify it using all relevant available evidence. And, by Occam’s razor, competing hypotheses that are overly complex and which can only rely on cherry picked data, or prejudicial assumptions contradicted by the evidence, are rejected.

The simplest hypothesis—that no novel pathogen emerged in 2019/20, whether from Wuhan or elsewhere, and that any apparent novelty was merely an illusion driven by technology and propaganda—therefore remains the default; after five years of “searches,” no body of evidence has been assembled to supplant it.

Hence, we place the burden on Lord Ridley and Professor van der Merwe to account for and address the holes in their hypothesis and show how the mass of evidence we have collected does not falsify their claims:

  • How did the entity named SARS-CoV-2 get from a lab in Wuhan to other places? How long did the journey take? By what routes did it “travel” (if it “travelled”)?
  • When did SARS-CoV-2 begin to affect humans in a unique way (i.e. differentiable from other influenza-like-illnesses or colds)? In what research papers, data or qualitative evidence should we have seen this and when did these unique symptoms first start to appear?
  • Why did SARS-CoV-2 first appear in some places with higher incidence than it did in others? What accounts for the synchronous “arrivals” between geographically disparate places?
  • How was it possible for SARS-CoV-2 to be “spreading” without having any impact on all-cause or respiratory disease death levels until after officials in a country declared an emergency and launched mass testing?
  • Why did it appear to “hit hard” or “explode” in some cities but not others, even where the cities have similar characteristics?

More specific to the alleged starting point:

  • Doesn’t the absence of infected animals and animal traders at the Wuhan market–and no early ‘cases’ being affiliated with any other market in Wuhan–present a serious challenge to the “lab leak” view as well? If a highly infectious and transmissible SARS virus escaped in early fall 2019, then how did it avoid animals at the Wuhan market–as well as people who had been at other markets and densely populated places?
  • Likewise, if the agent is so infectious and transmissible, then why did the clusters appear only in Wuhan and not in other provinces? If the answer is ‘because China is hiding information about illness reports and the ‘true’ start of the epidemic, then what reason is there to trust anything else that Chinese officials, doctors, and scientists claimed? Is there any evidence of clusters of unusual illness elsewhere in China prior to December 2019?
  • Finally, why is there a marked absence of clusters of unusual illness in nearly every country before the explosion in “cases” coincident with the institution of mass testing? Wouldn’t the (purported) spread of something so contagious and deadly—which resulted in such cases being so widely geographically dispersed—have been bound to manifest in surveillance reports or in some other way?

Matt Ridley is concerned about a lack of interest in the “origins of covid”. We share those concerns, whilst obviously disagreeing with his central premise. In the spirit of scientific inquiry, we would be delighted if the authors could engage with us by answering our questions.

A robust, well-reasoned response which confronts the holes in their favoured hypothesis can only serve to strengthen their claims.



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2 responses to “Response to Matt Ridley and Lab Origin proponents: This covid narrative collapses under the slightest scrutiny.”

  1. Taking a look at the testimony Kristian Andersen submitted to the U.S. Select Committee on the Coronavirus Pandemic is very helpful insofar as defining what a “lab leak” is. I agree with Andersen about “lab leak” not being a consistent single hypothesis “but rather several different scenarios in which the pandemic could have been linked to research activity.” Research-based versus natural origin is how the CIA assessment characterized possibilities as well.

    https://oversight.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/Testimony-of-Dr.-Kristian-Andersen.pdf

    Andersen:

    In early 2020, I initially believed that SARS-CoV-2 could have come from the lab. Before going any further, it is important to understand that the idea of a “lab leak” is not a consistent single hypothesis, but rather several different scenarios in which the pandemic could have been linked to research activity. Importantly, most of these scenarios are mutually exclusive. For example, if one lab is suspected, then another must be excluded. It is also important to understand the difference between “possible” and “probable” (or “plausible”). Because we almost always lack proof of outbreak origins, all scenarios are possible. However, that does not mean that they are all equally probable. The latter determination requires relevant expertise and is informed by prior information and precedent, as well as data, evidence, and analyses.
    There are several versions of a “lab leak” that we considered as part of our scientific studies. In the following section, I will explain how I think (and thought) about the various scenarios, as there are no formal definitions.

    1. A “purposefully” manipulated virus. In this scenario, a scientist would have created a virus for the purpose of creating SARS-CoV-2 with the exact properties that we observe (e.g., high transmissibility). In other words, in this scenario, a scientist intentionally created this exact virus, for example a “bioweapon”. In Proximal Origin we specifically use this term and state that “SARS-CoV-2 is not a purposefully manipulated virus”. Scientists simply do not have the ability to do this.

    2. An engineered virus. This is a subset of the one above, however, here we do not consider whether the engineering was “purposeful” or not, and so a “bioweapon” would not fall into this category. In Proximal Origin, we did not directly consider this scenario, however, we state that “it is improbable that SARS-CoV-2 emerged through laboratory manipulation”. We also stated that SARS-CoV-2 “is not a laboratory construct”, referring to one of the many existing reverse-genetics systems available for studying betacoronaviruses.

    3. A cultured virus. In this scenario, a virus sampled in nature was brought to a lab where it was cultured either in cells or animals. There are many reasons why such an experiment may be performed, including to “isolate” the virus from a sample (e.g., a bat), passage the virus on cells to understand its properties (e.g., can it bind to human ACE2 receptors?), or passage it in animals to e.g., look for its ability to cause disease. Some of these experiments may be done repeatedly, for example by continuous passage in cell cultures or animals. In Proximal Origin, we directly considered this scenario (“3. Selection during passage”), however, as we concluded, we did not, and do not, find this scenario plausible.

    4. Other research-related accidents. There are other research-related accidents that some people may consider to be a “lab leak”. For example, researchers getting infected as part of sampling bats, causing the start of a pandemic. Similarly, a contaminated sample could be brought back to the lab, where it could infect a researcher. Another example may be the 1977 influenza pandemic, which may have been associated with challenge studies as part of vaccine research (51). We did not consider any of these scenarios in Proximal Origin, for the simple reason that we believe that the likelihood of any of these having occurred with a novel virus, and given the evidence, is virtually zero. Further, while still equally unlikely, several of these scenarios would be the result of a zoonosis, even if associated with research activity (e.g., the infection of a scientist studying bats in the field).

    5. Zoonosis. This is the spillover of a virus directly from animals, potentially via an intermediate host. We directly considered this scenario in Proximal Origin (“1. Natural selection in an animal host before zoonotic transfer” and “2. Natural selection in humans following zoonotic transfer”). Given precedent and available evidence, I consider a zoonosis the only plausible and supported hypothesis for the emergence of SARS-CoV-2 (specifically, scenario #1, above).

    Comparison of scenarios and their level of plausibility

    When comparing the various possible SARS-CoV-2 emergence scenarios it is important to remember that we are looking at a one in a lifetime event (pandemics caused by novel viruses and as severe as the COVID-19 pandemic are fortunately rare). Hence SARS-CoV-2 must be ‘special’. If it was not, it would not have caused the very pandemic we are observing (see, for example, SARS-CoV-1). This means that whenever we assess the uniqueness of this virus (e.g., its ability for efficient human-to-human transmission), there is a very large “survivorship bias”. We need to be acutely aware of this confounder.

    Importantly, all research-associated scenarios are predicated on scientists successfully having managed to either: (1) directly having found the next pandemic virus via random sampling, (2) having endowed an otherwise natural virus with the exact properties that made it go pandemic, or (3) having created a pandemic virus from scratch (or based on novel, never-before reported, ‘backbones’). All of these scenarios are also predicated on those same scientists having lied about their activities, having successfully covered it all up, accidentally having infected themselves, and all of those steps having led to a pandemic linked to the very place we would expect zoonoses with novel viruses to happen — a wet market selling wild animals.

    A priori, all of these scenarios are immensely less likely than the risk that the wild-life trade poses across South-East Asia and elsewhere (47, 48, 52). Via these activities, viruses constantly ‘try’ to start the next pandemic and sarbecoviruses (the subgenus SARS-CoV-1 and SARS-CoV-2 belongs to) present especially high risk (53). Add to that, the genomic, clinical, epidemiological, and environmental evidence that we have — combined with the lack of any evidence for a “lab leak”, including evidence we would expect to have found (e.g., any ‘chatter’ about a virus that could have been SARS-CoV-2, or a very close precursor, at the Wuhan Institute of Virology prior to the pandemic) — and the likelihood, in my opinion, of a “lab leak” goes from “plausible” to “unlikely” to “not plausible”.

  2. Another Hockett-only add-on:

    In the above piece, we said, “Before addressing some of the paper’s language and claims, it’s worth noting the irony of one of the UK’s most influential news organizations—whose Global Health coverage is partially funded by the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation—declaring: ‘Here’s the Covid Paper They Don’t Want You to Read’” and linked to this page: https://www.telegraph.co.uk/global-health/science-and-disease/global-health-security-site/

    We missed an opportunity there to point out The Telegraph’s advocacy of “Global Health SECURITY”. The use of “Security” implies real and important threats.

    I can’t find an analogue to that page/advocacy by a major US news organization. Multiple US health agencies have web pages dedicated to the concept, including the CDC: https://www.cdc.gov/global-health/topics-programs/global-health-security.html

    2012-2014 pages here, showing transition from “Global Health Strategy” to “Global Health Security”

    CDC Global Health Strategy, 2012
    https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/25529/cdc_25529_DS1.pdf
    “Global Health Security Branch: advancing global health security,” CDC Stacks, December 2013
    https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/34473/
    “Global Health Security Demonstration Projects,” archived CDC page, FY 2013
    https://archive.cdc.gov/www_cdc_gov/globalhealth/security/demoprojects.htm
    “Rapidly Building Global Health Security Capacity — Uganda Demonstration Project, 2013,” MMWR, January 31, 2014
    https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm6304a2.htm
    “Strengthening Global Health Security Capacity — Vietnam Demonstration Project, 2013,” MMWR, January 31, 2014
    https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm6304a3.htm
    “Why Global Health Security Matters,” archived CDC page, February 13, 2014
    https://archive.cdc.gov/www_cdc_gov/globalhealth/security/why.htm

    FYI: Public Health England was “abolished” and replaced by UK Health Security Agency in 2021. Timeline below.

    August 2020: UK government announced PHE would be abolished/restructured.
    March 24, 2021: Matt Hancock announced the new body would be called the UK Health Security Agency.
    April 1, 2021: UKHSA was formally established.
    October 1, 2021: PHE’s health protection functions transferred to UKHSA; other functions went to the Office for Health Improvement and Disparities, NHS England, and NHS Digital.

    I also note that, in October 2025, Matt Ridley’s X account commented on a Telegraph story about climate change and said, “Warning. When you see an unbalanced ;news” article like this in the @Telegraph written by their global health security team, you should know that it is a paid advertorial, funded by the Gates Foundation.”
    https://x.com/mattwridley/status/1983433653662392485

    So, Mr. Ridley apparently would have people regard that article as a paid advert, because it advances ideas with which he disagrees, but regard his and Prof Van Der Merwe’s piece as unaffected by the Telegraph’s “global health security” position and Gates’ funding thereof

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